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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



7 May 1971

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Draft Request for Requirements Endorsement

1. As we all recognize, the work of the ad hoc Committee on Intelligence Resources and Allocations became temporarily submerged by a series of other demands for detailed studies levied by the SRG. Now that that wave has momentarily crested, I would like to get our endeavors back in gear.

2. Appended hereto is a draft memorandum to the Chairman of the SRG intended to reflect our collective ideas and previous discussions. I would very much like to caucus on this paper to develop an agreed text we can forward to the DCI for transmission over his signature to Dr. Kissinger. Per telephone calls made separately to each recipient, I would like to meet in my office at 1600 on Monday, 10 May.

[REDACTED]
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Chairman, Senior Review Group

SUBJECT: Request for Guidance Regarding
Indochina Intelligence Requirements

1. As we have discussed in detail at recent SRG meetings, over the next two years -- and beyond -- the overall Indochina situation is bound to undergo marked changes. We cannot predict their precise dimensions with certainty, but we can be certain that major changes will occur, partly -- perhaps primarily -- because of the variations that are going to occur in the nature, scope and extent of the US role in the Indochina area.

2. The certain knowledge that there will be major changes in the overall Indochina situation coupled with the impossibility of predicting with precision their full scope or exact nature, poses major planning problems for the intelligence community. The United States Intelligence Board, collectively, and its several member agencies individually all face major decisions with regard to the resources which ought to be or will have to be allocated to the "Indochina problem" over the next two to five years.

3. To facilitate this essential planning process, as Chairman of the USIB I have commissioned the formation of an ad hoc USIB Committee on Intelligence Resources and Asset Allocations for Indochina. The Committee's membership includes representatives of CIA, State/INR, DIA, NSA and the NSC Staff. It's chairman, acting on my behalf, is my Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs. I have tasked this Committee with surveying the intelligence problems we are likely to face in Indochina over the next two to five years. In its survey, the Committee has been specifically requested to address the role of US intelligence during this era of diminishing US presence, to identify the tasks with which the various individual community agencies are most likely to be charged, and to establish some guidelines that can facilitate decisions on the allocation of funds, personnel and equipment resources to those continuing intelligence problems directly related to Indochina. The Committee is to submit its analysis and recommendations to the USIB which will consider them and will forward those it regards favorably for policy-level consideration and approval.

4. When this Committee initially convened to tackle its assigned task, it immediately became evident that to prepare a meaningful survey of assets and a useful set of planning recommendations that related to the real world, the Committee first needed to clarify what was likely to be

required by policy levels of government from the intelligence community with respect to Indochina over the time frame in question. In essence, reasoned answers to all other questions hinged on the issue of requirements, in the broad sense of the information and judgments the intelligence community would be expected to provide or capabilities it would be expected to sustain so that senior US officials in Washington and in the field could make the requisite policy decisions and carry out their day to day responsibilities. The requirements question could have been handled by a set of alternative assumptions or hypotheses, but the Committee considered this an inefficient line of approach likely to produce a document more notable for length than for utility.

5. Instead, the Committee took the tack of framing its understanding of the requirements likely to be levied on the community over the period in question and offering them to the policy levels of the US Government for consideration, modification or endorsement. The Committee's analysis of projected requirements is appended as an attachment to this memorandum. In the approach here offered for consideration, these requirements are divided into two broad categories: tactical and national.

a. Tactical requirements involve data and information needed primarily to support and protect

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US forces in the field and their conduct of military operations. It is assumed that as the size of the US military presence diminishes and the level of direct participation in the struggle by US forces also diminishes, the need for "tactical intelligence" will also reduce (though not necessarily at an identical rate -- a small US force could have a more urgent need for tactical early warning of a major enemy attack than a large US force).

b. National requirements involve matters and data of continuing, longer-term interest to policy-level US officials whether or not US forces (of any level) are stationed in the Indochina area or engaged in combat activity therein.

6. The attached general statement of requirements reflects the current thinking of the ad hoc Committee's members and is generally consistent with the August 1970 Critical Collection Problems Committee report, "Intelligence Information Needs for the East Asia Area for FY 1972-76." They are being forwarded for your review and advice as to whether they reflect your judgment of what the intelligence community

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will be tasked to collect in the future, especially in light of the anticipated reduced US presence. If, indeed, these general requirements contain your understanding of our intelligence goals, the Committee will then move into the next phases of the exercise -- the refinement of requirements, assignment of priorities, identification and tasking of collectors, and development of recommendations for policy approval regarding the personnel and facilities required to accomplish these goals.

(to be signed by DCI)

Attachment

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GENERAL REQUIREMENTS - INDOCHINA

I. TACTICAL

Near-Term Communist Strategy and Tactics

Main Force Order of Battle - capabilities and
vulnerabilities

Organization, Capabilities and Vulnerabilities of
Insurgents and Local Forces

Target Data - identification, location, functional
characteristics of enemy units, logistics systems,
command and control centers, communications
facilities, important installations

Early Warning - intentions

Military Logistics Capability

II. NATIONAL

It is assumed that policy-level officials will need or want to be kept apprised of essentially the same things or factors with respect to each of the four Indochina States (North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia). The depth and timeliness of data required, however, will obviously vary from country to country. The level of detail needed on, for example, North Vietnam's offensive capabilities or South Vietnam's internal cohesion will be considerably greater than the matching requirement for Laos or Cambodia.

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Military

Strategy, Plans, Intentions, Priorities

Capabilities and Vulnerabilities - force levels, organi-

zation, disposition, composition, infiltration, *performance*

Leadership - relations, performance, political roles,
attitudes, stability

Threat Assessment - including order of battle and early
warning..

External Support - actual and potential

Political

Leadership - stability, political forces, sources of

support, performance, cohesion/conflict, *corruption*

Government Performance - policies, administration,

popular support, effectiveness, problems

Diplomatic Activities - international relations

Policy Decisions - issues, attitudes, suitability,

impact

Popular Support - morale, infrastructure

Internal Subversion and Security

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Economic Development

Industrial and Agricultural Progress - plans and
performance

Budget and Finance

Manpower - employment, utilization

External Relations

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